Homs Between Victories of The North and South

A blessed revolution pervaded all areas of Syria, in which the province of Homs took a leading position and, therefore, it was known as the Capital of Revolution. Homs witnessed the emergence of a strong formation of fighters who gradually organized themselves and later called the “Free Army”. The battalions of this army was formed by military dissidents from the criminal regime. As soon as the Free Army took over the leadership of resistance, achieved military victories and formed a strong organizational system that was about to defeat the criminal regime, other formations that do not comply with the principles of the Free Army have been declared, and they announced their separation from the organization for ideological reasons, which had a negative impact on the military action. External parties have supported some of these formations in order to strike a balance in the undeclared conflict between these parties themselves. This has resulted in a big gap among the rebels and has ended with turning the page of a revolutionary military institution with national decision and the transfer of decision making to most of different supporting parties with diverse backgrounds. This was offset on the other side by a complete unification between the Russian and Chinese support for regime as well as the Iranian intervention, which became clear and started to expand in Syria, in general, and Homs, in particular

Iranian approach insiders say that, as it was Tehran supported by Moscow behind the proposal of «Hunger or Surrender» policy in Homs, which was clearly written by elements of regime barriers beleaguered Al Waar district on large panels at the entrances of the district, they were also behind the idea of ​​ local ceasefire. This shows that this proposal opened an office for the Iranian mediator to deal with any breach of the agreement that the regime seeks reach in Homs. This office, managed by (Iranians) and rejected by the rebels, increased its activity soon, and they started to perform functions of the state and regime officers in the province. The (Iranians) became negotiators with the UN bodies dealing with human rights and providing relief to the affected in Homs, and they also worked to strengthen the minority Shiite sect members in Homs, who are scattered in a few villages in the countryside of the province, such as Al Mazraa and Riqqa villages, within the neighborhood of Al Waar district, as well as villages of Umm Al Amad, Umm Al Teen, Al Hamidiya, or willful mother figs and Hamidiya, in order to provide them with the Iranian care and support to form a unified military force with a Shiite nature under a name of (Imam Reda Brigade), which is considered the strongest among the regime supporting militias. Moreover, the (Iranians) released the hands of Iranian construction and architecture institutions to work in the city and its countryside, and they occupied properties and cultivated lands to serve its safavid project. They also craved after spreading Shiism in Homs countryside, Tadmor city and desert, since it is located on the road to supply Shiite Reda Brigade via the Iranian Brigade centralized near Mount of Zaghreen in Eastern countryside of Hama. They also turned al-Daba’a Airport, in the Southern countryside of the city, and all the cultivated areas around it to marijuana farms in order to fund terrorism operations carried out by Hezbollah and Khamenei militias. The (Iranians) went too far in their transgressions to include custody of the regime media and directing them in proportion to their project according to Al Allam and Al-Manar channels policy

Military forces in Homs repeatedly appealed in vain all party supporters of the revolution (institutions, bodies, organizations, parties, nations, etc.) to provide Homs with the necessary support to maintain the gains of the revolution there, at a time when the rebels there offer precious and cheap to survive and continue. The parties who forgot about Homs are not confined to the opposition bodies, which originally failed to effectively express, represent and secure their support to the revolution. But this exceeded to the so-called (Group of Friends of the Syrian People), which has refused and continues to refuse providing support to Homs, arguing that most of the battalions have a color contrasting to the (green) color to be support. This is because these countries embrace the so-called intellectual extremism, and that the demographic distribution could lead to a sectarian war crimes one the military support is provided. Even the two centers of hostilities in the South (Al Mog) and in the north (Al Moum), which were originally created to distribute international military support to the Syrian revolution, now include factions from different Syrian regions except the Homs. Moreover, there are some players wanted to support Homs, so they asked fighters from Homs to travel to camps in northern Syria or to send them to external training courses on individual arms after four years passed since the beginning of war. These players know well that the regime many tolerate, and even help indirectly, in traveling Homs fighters, but definitely it is keen to prevent their return to Homs. This way, Homs in left to a hateful Iranian flow and a clear safavid invasion without being assisted even by those who are concerned with this evil flow, which the rebels of Homs do not have a choice other than negotiations with them directly in order to preserve the lives of civilians, in spite of the international resolutions against the policy of starvation (as it took place during the siege of the city)

As for the US position which, unlike the positions of other Western countries, is a critical factor that would change the trends of events in Syria, it repeats its concerns about terrorism and considers terrorism as a common enemy between Damascus and Washington. It also invokes it to refrain from providing effective support to the revolutions because of the reality of the Syrian opposition. Therefore, the majority of the rebels doubts about the US vision of the Syrian issue, especially after the US President Obama’s statement, in which he expressed his hope for Iran to play a role in the region after the settlement of the Nuclear Deal. It seems that Obama, with his policy in the Middle East, works to implement the recommendations of the former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, when she has been asked in a press conference: What do you do if you become the president of the United States? She replied: I would work to change America’s allies in the places of its influence

Homs has suffered from lack of support for the rebels for more than two years. The people there in the vast areas that has got rid of the regime’s control wonder about the great deal of intentional or unintentional denial and negligence to the stationed fighters on Homs fronts, in face of the regime, from the side of Syrian revolution supporters. Stability of those fronts in the city of Homs is a victory in itself, but it is in a permanent need of ingredients. The same case applies to the beleaguered Al Waar district in the city, which the regime views bombing and tightening the blockade around it as a factor to raise the morale of its loyal people when it is dogged by defeats. The dilemma of lack of support for Homs is an old-new dilemma, as it was raised since the beginning of the formation of (resigned) staff that support would be directed to northern Syrian (Aleppo and Idlib), then fighters advance from there to the rest of fronts, just as the Libyan way in defeating the Gaddafi regime. This is rejected by military leaders of Homs because it would lead to the collapse of the liberated areas, which have become fronts of contact with the regime forces that consume their ammunition throughout the day (and this was why regions like the western countryside of Homs has fallen). In addition, stopping the two great battles, which have been announced to break the siege around Homs, was only because of military support interruption in the battle of “One Body” (lack in m/d), and because it approached the red lines of the Shiite, Ismaili and Nusayri villages in the battle of “Qademoun”

However, the question is that does the situation in the Capital of Revolution remain as it is in front of victories achieved in the southern and northern fronts, from which Homs have not mostly benefited but morally?

The south fronts are geographically distant from the front of Homs, and coordination is almost non-existent between the these fronts. For north front, after the supervisor victories achieved, the development of action will be towards (Aleppo – Coast – Hama) led by forces most of which do not receive international support from (Al Mog or Al Moum). Thus, these forces have a great opportunity to make military free decision. If these forces succeed in developing its operations towards Hama, they’ll find two other ideological and demographical obstacles, which prevent the implementation of their goal. The ideological obstacle is represented in the control of the Islamic State on eastern Hama countryside, where no other force is allowed to implement its project. The demographical obstacle is represented in the Ismaili, Nusayri and Christian villages, which will be taken by the criminal regime as a first line of defense by trading with the issue minorities again.

In addition, some regime supporters find that directing forces of conquests toward the central region (Hama and Homs) will be positive in terms of stopping the development of military action off the coast (the popular custody of the regime criminal elite), and that the battles there will be very difficult because of the geographical nature, multiple possible clashes and lengthy supply lines.

Therefore, the way out of this intractable situation in Homs is to support formations stationed in the liberated areas in order for the city to be able to carry out defensive military actions to strengthen its fronts and other military attacks to break the cordon, which overwhelm the city day after day. Moreover, supporter people of Homs have to increase their efforts for their families as they are in bad need of this today, especially as the regime tries to satisfy (Khamenei) by means of increasing the influence of (Iranians) after a series of defeats they suffered in the North.

The remaining hopes of Homs are represented in the fact that a lot of Northern victories’ leaders come from and totally belong to Homs, and many hands that carried guns of victory in the also come from Homs. In addition, a great deal of tears of joy rained in the north from the eyes of Homs people who yearn for a near victory from Allah soon

Allah’s will shall be realized

1 Reply to “Homs Between Victories of The North and South”

  1. يقول admin:

    محمد عباس : العمل عمل مؤسساتي ويظهر ويعرف الغرب بحقيقة الثورة السورية

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